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Andrea Beck*

Aboriginal Consultation in Canadian Water
Negotiations: The Mackenzie Bilateral
Water Management Agreements

Due to constitutional protection of Aboriginal water rights, the Canadian
government has a duty to consult Aboriginal peoples in water-related decision
making. In 2015, Alberta and the Northwest Territories signed an agreement for
managing their shared waters in the Mackenzie River Basin. In light of Canada's
record, observers have praised the preceding negotiation process as pathbreaking due to its high level of Aboriginal involvement. To evaluate such claims,
this paper analyzes Aboriginal consultations in the 2011-2015 NWT-Alberta
transboundary water negotiation. The comparative case study reaches the
following conclusions. In their bilateral water negotiation, the two jurisdictions
differed markedly in terns of consultative approaches. While Alberta was oriented
towards legal minimum requirements under Canadian constitutional law. the NWT
implemented extensive consultations characterized by early involvement, multifaceted engagement mechanisms, emphasis on dialogue and collaboration,
capacity building, and recognition of Aboriginal groups as governments. Although
shortcomings remained in terms of direct Aboriginal access and accommodation,
the NWT achieved a high standard of consultation, which aligns with emerging
thinking on the international principle of free, prior; and informed consent (FPIC).
Overall, the NWT experience holds important implications for moving FPIC from
an international norm to a domestic template for action in Canada.
En raison de Ia protection constitutionnelle des droits autochtones a 'eau, le
gouvernemnent canadien a pour obligation de consulter les peuples autochtones
lors de prise de decisions lides a l'eau. En 2015, l'Alberta et les Territoires du NordOuest ont signe un accord pour la gestion de leurs eaux partagees dans le bassin
du fleuve Mackenzie. Au vu des precedents canadiens, certains observateurs
ont salue ce processus de negociation pour son haut niveau de participation
des Autochtones. Afin d'valuer ces revendications, cet article analyse les
consultations avec les groupes autochtones dans la ndgociation transfrontalire
de leau, qui a eu lieu entre 2011 and 2015. Letude comparative de lAlberta et
des TN-O arrive aux conclusions suivantes. Dans leurs negociations bilaterales
de l'eau, les deuxjuridictions different considerablement en termes d'approches
consultatives. Alors que lAlberta a employe les exigences minimales Igales en
vertu du droit constitutionnel canadien. les TN-O ont mis en cauvre un procdri de
consultation extensif caracterise par 'implication des peuples autochtones des
le debut des negociations, des mncanismes participatifs a multiples facettes,
le dialogue et la collaboration, des efforts de renforcement des capacites, et
I'identification des groupes autochtones en tant que gouvernements. Mdme
si des lacunes subsistent en termes d'aces direct et d'accommodement des
Autochtones, les TN-O ont developpe un procedei de consultation aux standards
eleves, qui s'aligne avec la pensee rmnergente sur le principe international du consentement prealable, donne librement, et en connaissance de cause (CPLCC).
Lexprrience dans les TN-O detient d'importantes implications pour la mise en
couvre de ia norme internationale CPLCC dans un contexte canadien.
*
Doctoral student, Department of Urban Studies and Planning, Massachusetts Institute of
Technology. I want to express my gratitude to all interviewees For generously oflering their time
and insight. I also thank Larry Susskind, Murray Clamen, David Hsu, the students in 11.800 (MIT
Doctoral Research Seminar, Spring 2016), and an anonymous peer reviewer for their careful reading
of earlier drafts of this paper and their most helpful comments and suggestions.
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Introduction
Canada's Aboriginal peoples have a special relationship with water.

To First Nations, Inuit and Metis peoples,' water is critical for health,
subsistence lifestyles, traditional practices, and spiritual well-being.
Aboriginal cultures are so closely connected to water that "when waters
are endangered, the very identity and survival of indigenous peoples

1.
The Aboriginal peoples of Canada include Indian, Inuit and M6tis peoples, see Consitiuion Act,
1982, being Schedule B to the CanadaAct 1982 (UK), 1982, c 11, s 35(2) [Constitution4c].

Aboriginal Consultation in Canadian Water Negotiations:
The Mackenzie Bilateral Water Management Agreements

489

is endangered. 2 Canada's seemingly abundant water resources are
increasingly coming under pressure due to land use activities, water
diversion schemes, population growth, climate change, and fragmented
intejurisdictional governance mechanisms.' In light of these forces,
and despite many years of colonialization, "indigenous peoples have
maintained awe and reverence for the life-giving force of water and.
across generations, have continued to call for the return of indigenous
laws and traditions so that [they] can protect [their] peoples, waters, and
territories." 4
In Canada, Aboriginal water rights are protected under the Constitution
Act, 1982, section 35(1). As a result of constitutional protection and a
series of Supreme Court decisions, the Crown must consult Aboriginal
peoples and accommodate their rights when considering actions that may
adversely affect their lands and waters.' However, in the past, Canadian
governments have often failed to live up to their legal obligations. As
Deborah McGregor notes with regard to First Nations., when it comes to
water, they "still find themselves on the outside looking in, struggling to
be heard in the very decisions that affect their lives." According to Ardith
Walkem, ld]espite the promise of constitutional protection of Aboriginal
title, Aboriginal rights, and treaty rights, the ability of indigenous peoples
to protect waters remains constrained."
Indeed, Canadian history is replete with examples of infringements of
Aboriginal water rights and the Crown's failure to fulfil its duty to consult.
Early examples include large-scale hydro developments in Quebec and
Manitoba. 9 Starting in the 1970s, these developments led to the flooding

&

2.
Ardith Walkem, "The Land is Dry: Indigenous Peoples, Water, and Environmental Justice" in
Karen Bakker, ed, Fau Canada: The Future ofCanada' Iiter (Vancouver: UBC Press, 2007) 303 at
304.
3.
Karen Bakker, "Water Security: Canada's Challenge" (2009) Policy Options 16; Karen Bakker
& Christina Cook, "Water Governance in Canada: Innovation and Fragmentation" (2011) 27:2
Intl J Water Resources Development 275; Carey Hill et al, "Harmonization versus Subsidiarity in
Water Governance: A Review of Water Governance and Legislation in the Canadian Provinces and
Territories" (2008) 33:4 Can Water Resources J 315, John B Sprague, "Great Wet North? Canada's
Myth of Water Abundance" in Karen Bakker, ed, Eau Canada: The Future of Canada I1ater
(Vancouver: I BC Press, 2007) 22.
4.
Halkern, supra note 2 at 304.
5.
Constitution Act, supra note 1; s 35(1) reads: "The existing aboriginal and treaty rights of the
aboriginal peoples of Canada are hereby recognized and affirmed."
6.
HValken, supra note 2 at 306-308.
7.
Deborah McGregor, "Traditional Know ledge and Water Governance: The Ethic of'Responsibility"
(2014) 10:5 AlterNative: An Intl J Indigenous Peoples 493 at 496.
8.
HValkern, supra note 2 at 308.
9.
Bruce E Johansen, Indigenous Peoples and Environmental Issues: 4n Fncyclopedia (Westport
London: Greenwood Press, 2003) at 66-81.
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of traditional hunting areas, mercury poisoning, and displacement of
communities. They disrupted entire ways of life of Crec and Inuit peoples.,
who were not consulted before construction began and have struggled with
these projects well into the 2000s. Similar disregard for consultation and
accommodation has been observed more recently with respectto watershed
management in Ontario,1 as well as oil sands development in Alberta."
Moreover, drinking water security has remained a major concern on many
First Nations reserves across Canada. As inequalities in provision and
management persist., many communities have remained under drinking
water advisories for years, and have been exposed to heightened risks of
waterborne infectious diseases.12
To fight against exclusion from water-related decision making and
violations of their water rights, Aboriginal communities and individuals
have engaged in multiple courses of action. Beyond filing law suits in
Canadian courts. they have found innovative ways of making their voices
heard, for example by submitting petitions; organizing campaigns, forums
and press conferences; engaging in awareness raising and environmental
advocacy; establishing their own environmental monitoring systems; and
publishing their own studies. Although the direct impact of these actions
on government decision making has sometimes been limited, they once
again underscore the fundamental importance of water to the physical,
cultural, and spiritual well-being of Canada's Aboriginal peoples."
In the midst of this ongoing struggle, an important water agreement
has recently been signed in Canada's Mackenzie River Basin, a vast
internal transboundary basin discharging from central Alberta into the
10. Michael Mascarenhas, "Where the Waters Divide: First Nations, Tainted Water and
Environmental Justice in Canada" (2007) 12:6 Local Environment 565; Peigi Wilson, "First Nations
Integrated Watershed Management" in Dan Shrubsole, ed, Canadian Perspectives on Integrated
Mater Resources Management (Cambridge: Canadian Water Resources Association, 2004) 69.
11. Jennifer Huseman & Damien Short, "'A Slow Industrial Genocide': Tar Sands and the Indigenous
Peoples ofNorthern Alberta" (2012) 16:1 Intl JHR 216; Monique Passelac-Ross & Karin Buss, "Water
Stewardship in the Lower Athabasca River: Is the Alberta Government Paying Attention to Aboriginal
Rights to Water?" (2012) 23 J End L & Prac 69.
12. See, e.g., Laura Eggertson, "Despite Federal Promises, First Nations' Water Problems Persist"
(2008) 178:8 CMAJ 985; Jason McCullough & Khosrow Farahbakhsh, "Refocusing the Lens:
Drinking Water Success in First Nations in Ontario" (2015) 58:2 Can Public Administration 271;
Alasdair Morrison, Lori Bradford & Lalita Bharadwaj, "Quantifiable Progress of the First Nations
Water Management Strategy, 2001-2013: Ready for Regulation?" (2015) 40:4 Can Water Resources
J 352; Jerry P White, Laura Murphy & Nicholas Spence, "Water and Indigenous Peoples: Canada's
Paradox" (2012) 3:3 Intl Indigenous Policy J 1.
13. See, e.g., Johansen, supra note 9 at 70-74, 80-81 Emma S Norman, Governing Transboundary
Maters: Canada. the United Stotes. and Indigenous Couninties (New York: Routledge, 2015) at
105-160; Passelac-Ross & Buss, supra note 11 at 72; Frank Quinn, "As Long as the Rivers Run: The
Impacts of Corporate Water Development on Native Communities in Canada" (1991) 11:1 Can J
Native Studies 137; Walkem, supra note 2 at 312.
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Beaufort Sea. In March 2015, the province of Alberta and the Northwest
Territories (NWT) signed a bilateral water management agreement for
their shared waters in the basin. While this agreement is significant for
a variety of political, economic and ecological reasons, the agreement
itself and the preceding negotiation were also praised for their inclusion of
Aboriginal peoples and concerns. According to one Canadian water expert,
a path-breaking agreement was signed between Alberta, the Northwest
Territories, and all affected indigenous groups for joint management of
the huge Mackenzie River basin...." In his view, the agreement can be
regarded as a "breakthrough not only for results but also for a process that
involved all of the relevant indigenous groups....""
In light of Canada's past record, such observations warrant systematic
attention. Does the NWT-Alberta transboundary water negotiation indeed
constitute an unusual achievement in terms of Aboriginal consultation?
If so, what are the main factors that account for this success? Finally.
what implications does the Mackenzie experience hold for enhancing
Aboriginal involvement in government decision making? Answers to
these questions can yield important advice for policy makers wishing to
break with recurrent cycles of litigation and work toward achieving the
aim of reconciliation in Canada."
To examine these questions, this paper proceeds as follows. It begins by
reviewing the Canadian and international law on Aboriginal consultation,
focusing in particular on the duty to consult and accommodate and the
principle of free, prior, and informed consent (FPIC). This review elicits
criteria that can be used to assess a consultation process in the Canadian
context. After setting out background information about the Mackenzie
River Basin and its transboundary water management regime, the identified
criteria are applied to the 2011-2015 NWT-Alberta water negotiation.
Data from interviews and documents provide the basis for a comparative
analysis of Aboriginal consultations in Alberta versus the NWT.16 To
account for the divergent findings in these cases, the next section explores
14. David B Brooks, Book Review of Governing Transboundary Tfiers: Canada the UnitedStates
and Indigenous Communities by Emma S Norman (2015) 40:7 Water Intl 1074 at 1077.
15. For a discussion of reconciliation within the context of self-determination in Canada. see Brenda
L, Gunn, "Moving Beyond Rhetoric: Working Toward Reconciliation Through Self-Determination"
(2015) 38:1 Dal IJ 237.
16. Data for this research were collected between January and April 2016, and draw primarily on
13 semi-structured telephone interview s, as well as policy documents, public online resources, and
published studies. Interviewees were selected purposeftilly on account of their direct participation
in the transboundar negotiation, their involvement in Aboriginal consultation, and/or their expert
know ledge. Respondents included three negotiating team members from Alberta; four negotiating
team members from the NWT; two Aboriginal representatives; and four members of civil society or
academia.
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potential explanatory factors, including differences in legal considerations
and socio-political relationships, and, more fundamentally, the effects
of colonial boundaries. In closing, the paper discusses implications for
enhancing Aboriginal consultation in Canada.
I.

Evaluating Aboriginal consultation

1. Canadianconstitutionallow: The duty to consult and accommodate
In Canada, Aboriginal water rights can be recognized and protected in
several possible ways. These include reserve water rights, as well as
Aboriginal title (a right to the exclusive use and occupation of lands,
including waters, resulting from historic relationships with territories),
Aboriginal rights (collective rights that contribute to the cultural and
physical survival of Aboriginal peoples), and treaty rights (rights that are
defined in historic treaties or modern land claims agreements)." As noted
above, Aboriginal title, Aboriginal rights and treaty rights, including those
related to water, are constitutionally protected under the ConstitutionAct,
section 35(1). In a number of decisions, the Supreme Court of Canada has
determined that the Crown has a duty to consult Aboriginal peoples, and
must possibly accommodate their proven or credibly asserted rights."
In HaidaNation, the Court noted that the content of the duty to consult
varies with circumstances, and should be proportionate to the strength of
the claim and the seriousness of the potential adverse effect." To clarify
the duties that may arise in different situations, the Court proposed
the concept of a spectrum. At one end of the spectrum lie cases where
Aboriginal claims are weak or the potential for infringement is minor. In
these cases "the only duty on the Crown may be to give notice., disclose
information, and discuss any issues raised in response to the notice." At
the other end lie cases where the claim is strong, the respective right and
the potential infringement are highly significant to the Aboriginal peoples,
and the risk for non-compensable damage is high. In such cases, "deep
consultation" may be required.2' Although the Court in Delgamuukw

&

17. Walkem, supra note 2 at 304-309; for a more detailed discussion of the three species of
Aboriginal rights (Aboriginal title, non-title Aboriginal rights, and treaty rights), see David Reid
Stephanie Hickman, "Aboriginal Rights and the Atlantic Canada Petroleum Industry" (2007) 30:2 Dal
U 383 at 386-393.
18. R vSparrow, [1990] 1 SCR 1075, 70 DLR (4th) 385; Delgamuikw vBritish Coluibia, [1997] 3
SCR 1010, 153 DLR (4th) 193 [Delgamuukw]; Haida Nation vBriish Columbia (Ifinister
ofForests),
2004 SCC 73, [2004] 3 SCR 511 [Haida Nation]; Taku River Tijngit First Nation v British Columia
(Profect4ssessnent Director), 2004 SCC 74, [2004] 3 SCR 550; Mikisew CreeFirstNation v Canada
(finister offanadianHeritage), 2005 SCC 69, [2005] 3 SCR 388.
19. Haida Nation, supra note 18 at paras 39-51.
20. Ibid at paras 43-44.
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raised the possibility of "full consent" 2 1 it made clear in HaidaNation that
this option is only available in exceptional cases and does not grant a veto
to Aboriginal peoples. 2 The Court also indicated that the duty to consult
does not imply a duty to agree.
However, when making decisions that could adversely affect the
exercise of Aboriginal rights and claims, the Crown is obliged to follow
a process of consultation that is meaningful and conducted in good faith.
As noted by the Court, the effect of such a consultation process may be to
reveal a duty to accommodate. In other words, '[m]eaningful consultation
may oblige the Crown to make changes to its proposed action" to avoid
irreparable harm or to minimize the effects of potential infringements.
According to the Court, accommodation entails "seeking compromise in
an attempt to harmonize conflicting [societal and Aboriginal] interests and
move further down the path of reconciliation."2
The duty to consult and accommodate is now firmlv established
under Canadian constitutional law. Yet., uncertainties about its exact
interpretation remain. As Thomas Isaac and Anthony Knox point out.
"[s]ince its first appearance, the Crown's duty to consult has inspired
considerable confusion and conflicting views in the academic literature as
to its meaning and implications."2 Indeed, as noted by Lori Sterling and
Peter Landmann, many important issues remain unresolved when it comes
to "who, when, how and on what to consult." 26 For instance, uncertainties
still exist as to when the duty is triggered, and how to determine an
adequate depth of consultation and accommodation.
Another challenge relates to the fact that the existing constitutional
framework for consultation and accommodation "does not readily
align with the aspirations and expectations of the impacted Aboriginal
communities ."2 From an Aboriginal perspective, constitutional protection
of their rights is limited since it only covers those areas which Canadian
governments and courts, seen as colonial institutions, are willing to

21. Delgamuukw, supra note 18 at para 168.
22. Haida Nation, supra note 18 at para 48.
23. Ibid at paras 42, 49.
24. Ibid at paras 46-50.
25. Thomas Isaac & Anthony Knox. "The Crown's Duty to Consult Aboriginal People" (2003) 41:1
Alta 1. Rev 49 at 50.
26. Lori Sterling & Peter Landmann, "The Duty to Consult Aboriginal Peoples: Government
Approaches to Unresolved Issues" in David A Wright & Adam I Dodek, eds, Public Law at the
McLachlin Court: The First Decade (Toronto: Irwin Law, 2011) 1 at 4 [emphasis in the original],
online: Canadian Bar Association <http://wwwwcba.org/cba/clePDF/Constit09_Sterlingpaper.pdf>.
27. William M Laurin & JoAnn P Jamieson, "Aligning Energy Development with the Interests of
Aboriginal Peoples in Canada" (2015) 53:2 Alta L, Rev 453 at 459.
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recognize. 2 ' Furthermore, protection afforded under constitutional law
does not match intemational human rights standards as they are commonly
interpreted by Aboriginal communities.
2.

Internationalhuman rights law: The principle offree, prior and
informed consent
The most important of these standards is the principle of free, prior, and
informed consent (FPIC), which has emerged over the past decades in
various contexts such as United Nations human rights treaty bodies.
International Labour Organization (ILO) treaties including 10 Convention
No. 169, and the Inter-American human rights system.3 o To date, FPIC
has been expressed most clearly in the UN Declaration on the Rights of
Indigenous Peoples (UNDRIP), which specifically bases FPIC on the right
to self-determination.3 1
The basic conditions of FPIC are to ensure that Indigenous peoples
are not coerced, intimated or pressured (free); that their consent is sought
before any activities are authorized or started (prior);that they have full
and accurate information in the appropriate language about the scope and
impacts of any proposed development, with opportunities for input from
traditional knowledge holders and respect for traditional decision making
processes (infbrmed); and that their concerns must have a meaningful
impact on the outcome (consent).12 The question of whether or not
"consent" implies an Indigenous veto right continues to be debated, and a
clear consensus has yet to emerge.3 3

28. Walkem, supra note 2 at 306.
29. Laurin & Jamieson, supra note 27 at 459-460.
30. See, e.g., Mauro Barelli, "Free, Prior and Informed Consent in the Aftermath of the UN
Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples: Developments and Challenges Ahead" (2012) 16:1
Intl JHR 1; Derek Inman, Stefaan Smis & Dorothee Cambou, "'We Will Remain Idle No More':
The Shortcomings of Canada's 'Duty to Consult' Indigenous Peoples" (2013) 5:1 Gottingen J Intl
L 251; Stefan Matiation & Josee Boudreau, "Making a Difference: The Canadian Duty to Consult
and Emerging International Norms Respecting Consultation with Indigenous Peoples" in Oonagh
E Fitzgerald, ed, The Globalized Rule of Law: Relationships between International and Domestic
Law (Toronto: Irwin Law, 2006). 397; Tara Ward, "The Right to Free, Prior, and Informed Consent:
Indigenous Peoples' Participation Rights within International Law" (2011) 10:2 Nw J Intl HR 54.
31. LA'Declaration on the Rights ofIndigenous Peoples, GA Res 61/295, UN Doe A/RES/61/295
(13 September 2007). art 19, 32(2); Ward, supra note 30 at 65.
32. Ward, supra note 30 at 54, 83-84; Andrea Carmen, "The Right to Free, Prior, and Infonned
Consent: A Framework for Harmonious Relations and New Processes for Redress" in Jackie Hartley,
Paul Joffe & Jennifer Preston, eds, Realizing the UAUDeclarationon the Rights oflndigenous Peoples:
Triumph, Hope, andlAction (Saskatoon: Purich Publishing, 2010) 120 at 124-125.
33. Barelli, supra note 30 at 16-17; Ward, supra note 30 at 58.
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Aboriginal peoples in Canada have strongly endorsed FPIC and
have tried to advance its implementation by various means.34 With
respect to water in particular, the Assembly of First Nations affirms that
"[c]onsultation to attain free, prior and informed consent of the affected
First Nations rights holders is a prerequisite priorto any decisions or actions
related to water contemplated by Canada, provinces or territories."35 In
the Canadian water governance literature, FPIC surfaces through calls for
collaborative sharing of traditional knowledge,3 6 demands for capacity
building to level the playing field between Aboriginal and non-Aboriginal
actors to allow for meaningful participation7 and expectations on the part
of Aboriginal peoples to be consulted according to their status as selfdetermining nations, rather than as one of many stakeholder groups."
The Conservative government of Prime Minister Stephen Harper
(2006-2015) long expressed concerns about UNDRIP. In 2007. Canada
was among the few states who voted against the Declaration.3 ' Although
Canada issued a Statement of Support in 2010, it continuously referred
to UNDRIP as a non-legally binding, aspirational document, with one
of its major concerns relating to FPIC when interpreted as a veto right.40
The change in federal government from Conservative to Liberal in 2015
seems to have brought about a change in political climate with respect to

34. Amnesty International Canada, "Free, Prior and Informed Consent" (2013), online: Amnesty
International Canada <https: www.amnesty.ca/sites/amnesty/files/fpic
factsheet nov 2013.pdf;
Ginger Gibson MacDonald & Gaby Zezulka, " nderstanding Successful Approaches to Free, Prior,
and Informed Consent in Canada-Part I" (2015) at 14-15, online: Boreal Leadership Council http:
borealcouncil. ca/wp-content uploads/2015 /09, BLC FPIC Successes Report Sept 2015 E.pdf>.
35. Assembly of First Nations, "Strategy to Protect and Advance Indigenous Water Rights" (2013).
online: <www.afn.ca/uploads/files/wvater/firstnationswaterstrategy.pdf>.
36. McGregor, supira note 7.
37. Suzanne von der Porten, Rob de Loe & Ryan Plummer, "Collaborative Environmental
Govemance and Indigenous Peoples: Recommendations for Practice" (2015) 17:2 Enytl Practice 134
at 141; see also Zebra Rizvi et al, "First Nation Capacity in Qu6bec to Practise Integrated Water
Resources Management" (2013) 7:3 Intl J Water 161.
38. Suzanne von der Porten & Rob C de Loc, "Collaborative Approaches to Governance for Water
and Indigenous Peoples: A Case Study from British Columbia, Canada" (2013) 50 Geoforum 149;
Suzanne von der Porten & Rob C de Lo, "Water Policy Reform and Indigenous Governance" (2014)
16:2 Water Policy 222; von der Porten et al, supra note 37.
39. Paul Joffe, "Canada's Opposition to the UN Declaration: Legitimate Concerms or Ideological
Bias?" in Jackie Hartley, Paul Joffe & Jennifer Preston, eds, Realizing the UIN Declaration on the
Rights ofindigenous Peoples: Jiumph, Hope, andAction (Saskatoon: Purich Publishing, 2010) 70.
40. Indigenous and Northern Affairs Canada, "Canada's Statement of Support on the United
Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples" (12 November 2010), online: Aboriginal
Affairs and Northern Development Canada <http:/www.aadnc-aandc.gc.ca/eng/130937423986
1/1309374546142>; Permanent Mission of Canada to the UN, "Canada's Statement on the World
Conference on Indigenous Peoples Outcome Document" (22 September 2014). online: <http://www.
canadainternational.gcca prmny-nponu/canada un-canada onu statements-declarations/otherautres/2014-09-22 wcipd-padd.aspx?lang eng>.
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Aboriginal issues, and the government of Prime Minister Justin Trudeau is
now looking for ways to implement UNDRIP. including FPIC.4 Similar
changes are underway in Alberta after the election of a new provincial
government in 2015.42 Against this backdrop, important questions have
arisen about the exact differences and similarities between the duty to
consult and accommodate and FPIC, and about ways of translating FPIC
into Canada's domestic legal context.
3. Evaluative criteria
As the domestic and international law on consultation is evolving, legal
uncertainty leaves some room for interpretation as to what may qualify as a
successful consultation process in Canada. Mindful of possible alternative
approaches, particularly regarding the exact meaning of consent and
accommodation, this paper proposes that such a process should meet the
following four criteria.
It should be free, meaning the absence of coercion and intimidation;
it should leave sufficient time for information gathering and decision
making prior to the authorization or commencement of any activities; it
should allow for informed decision making by providing impartial and
balanced information in the appropriate language, and by allowing for
collaborative incorporation of traditional knowledge; and it should be
meaninfid., implying that Aboriginal groups are supported by capacity
building, are treated as self-determining nations in a culturally appropriate
manner, and have real possibilities of affecting substantive outcomes
should accommodation be called for. Before applying these criteria to
Aboriginal consultation in Alberta and the NWT, the next section provides
an overview of the Mackenzie River Basin and transboundary water
negotiations.

II. The Mackenzie River Basin and transboundarywater negotiations
1. The Mackenzie River Basin
The Mackenzie River Basin covers an area of 1.8 million square
kilometres, equivalent to 20 per cent of Canada's landmass. It comprises

41. Office of the Prime Minister, "Minister of Indigenous and Northern Affairs Mandate Letter"
(2015), online: Prime Minister of Canada <http:/pm.gc.caleng minister-indigenous-and-northernaffairs-mandate-letter>; Joanna Smith, "Canada Will Implement UN Declaration on Rights of
Indigenous Peoples, Carolyn Bennett Says" The Toronto Star (8 December 2015), online: <https://
www.thestar. com news canada 201511/12/canada-will-implement-un-declaration-on-rights-ofindigenous-peoples-carolyn-bennett-says.html>.
42. Office of the Premier, "Premier Notley's Letter to Cabinet Ministers" (7 July 2015), online:
Premier ofAlberta <http://aboriginal.alberta.ca/documents/Premier-Notley-Letter-Cabinet-Ministers.
pdf>.
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six sub-basins, seven main rivers, three major lakes, and two freshwater
deltas, including the Peace-Athabasca Delta, which has been recognized
as a wetland of international importance. The basin is roughly split in two
by the 60th parallel, with the provinces of British Columbia, Alberta and
Saskatchewan being located upstream of Yukon and the NWT.4 3
Home to approximately 397,000 people, the Mackenzie River Basin is
sparsely populated. Thc majority of the population resides in the Alberta
portion of the basin. As of 2001, Aboriginal peoples accounted for about
15 per cent of the basin population. The Aboriginal population is highest
in the north, where most communities are small and located close to
rivers, lakes and the sea. Aboriginal peoples have lived in the basin for
thousands of years, and have traditional territories, treaty areas, and land
claims settlement regions within the basin.4 4 Over generations, they have
developed a detailed knowledge of the basin's ecosystems. and until today
maintain their traditions and close relationships with water.45 For instance,
the Dene people have a long-standing spiritual bond with the Mackenzie
River, which they call the Deh Cho, the Big River. Their ancient stories
teach the importance of maintaining a balance with the river, which some
elders regard as their lifeline.4 6
Over the past few decades, however, the waters of the Mackenzie
Basin have become threatened. In the 1970s, environmental stressors
began to increase significantly in the basin as a result of land use activities.
municipal sewage operations, pulp mills, oil and gas development, hydro-

'

43. G D Lewis, D Milburn & A Smart, "The Challenge of Interjurisdictional Water Management in
the Mackenzie River Basin" (1991) 16:4 Can Water Resources J 381 at 381-383; although parts of
Nunavut also fall within the Mackenzie River Basin, the share is so small that Nunavut is not typically
considered a basin jurisdiction, see Michelle Morris & Rob C de Loc, "Cooperative and Adaptive
Transboundary Water Governance in Canada's Mackenzie River Basin: Status and Prospects" (2016)
21:1 Ecology & Society.
44. Rob C de Loe & Michelle Morris, "Cooperative Transboundary Water Governance in Canada's
Mackenzie River Basin: Status and Prospects" in Dave Huitema & Sander Meijerink, eds, The
Politics of'River Basin Organisations: Coalitions, Institutional Design Choices and Consequences
(Cheltenham: Edward Elgar, 2014) 67 at 70-71.
45. Rosenberg International Forum on Water Policy., Report ofthe Rosenherg JnternationalForum
Workshop on TransboundarY Relations in the Mackenzie River Basin (2013) at 13-14, online: The
Gordon Foundation <http://gordonfoundation.ca/sites/default files/publications/Rosenberg o2OFinal
0020-0620WEB.pdf>.
46. The Gordon Foundation, "Cold Amazon: The Mackenzie River Basin" (2013), online: <http:/
gordonfoundation. ca/'water/mackenzie-river-basin-initiative cold-amazon>.
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electricity generation, and climate change. The bulk of development
activities took place in the southern provinces, while the area north
of the 60th parallel remained characterized by a subsistence lifestyle
highly dependent on the preservation of sensitive ecosystems. By the
1990s, the upstream and downstream portions of the Mackenzie River
Basin were divided by "[s]harply contrasting political, cultural and
economic conditions, as well as water use patterns.. "48
2.

The Mackenzie River Basin Transboundary Waters Master
Agreement
As pressures on the Mackenzie water resources increased, and
upstream-downstream divides continued to widen. the basin
jurisdictions recognized the need for a more cooperative management
approach. The drying-out of the Peace-Athabasca Delta due to dam
operations on the Peace River was a key driver for the creation of
the Mackenzie River Basin Liaison Committee in 1972. In 1977, this
body was reconstituted as the Mackenzie River Basin Committee,
which was in charge of a research program on basin hydrology and
ecology. In 1988, the basin jurisdictions began negotiating towards an
agreement for joint management of the basin's water resources. After
several rounds of negotiations and public comment, the Mackenzie
River Basin Transboundary Waters Master Agreement was signed
in 1997.49 This agreement provided a framework of broad principles
related to ecological integrity; sustainability; jurisdictional autonomy;
consultation, notification and information sharing; and cooperative
and harmonious dispute resolution. It also established a coordinating
river basin organization, the Mackenzie River Basin Board (MRBB).o
As a framework agreement, the Master Agreement left substantive
obligations to be negotiated between neighbouring jurisdictions
through seven bilateral water management agreements. However,
between 1997 and 2014, only the agreement between the NWT and

47. Jospeh M Culp, Terry D Prowse & Eric A Luiker, "Mackenzie River Basin" in Arthur C
Benke & C E Cushing, eds, Rivers ofNorthAimerica (Ansterdam: Elsevier, 2005) 805 at 808809; Frederick J Wrona, Joseph M Culp & Terry D Prowse, "Basin Management Approaches
Used in a High-Latitude Northern Catchment-The Mackenzie River Basin" in Robert C Ferrier
& Alan Jenkins, eds, Handbook of Catchnent Manageient (Chichester & Hoboken: WileyBlackwell, 2010) 477 at 481-483.
48. Lewis et al, supra note 43 at 381, 385.
49. R ACreery, "Avoiding Further Downstream Crises: The Mackenzie River Basin Committee"
(1979) 4:3 Can Water Resources J 60; de Lod & Morris, supra note 44 at 72-75.
50. For a more detailed discussion of the MRBB and its performance to date, see Morris & de
Loe, supra note 43.
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Yukon was concluded." In the meantime, the urgent need for a bilateral
water management agreement between Alberta and the NWT became
increasingly apparent. Tensions kept growing between development
activities upstream, and maintenance of traditional lifestyles downstream.
Yet, upstream-downstream negotiations were expected to be extremely
difficult due to power differentials and the fact that "the upstream
jurisdictions have no incentive to act against their own self-interest in the
development of the basin's water resources...."
3.

Bilateralwater negotiations

The initiative of the NWT eventually created momentum in bilateral water
negotiations: "As the twenty-first century opened, it was the government
of the Northwest Territories (GNWT) that took the political lead."
Reasons for this included resource management priorities of Aboriginal
land claims beneficiaries, mounting concern about potential negative
impacts of upstream industrial developments, evidence of Arctic climate
change, and the fact that the Mackenzie River Basin became much more
central to the NWT after the separation of Nunavut in 1999.54
In 2007, the GNWT, the government of Alberta, and the federal
government signed a Memorandum of Understandingon bilateral water
management negotiations. Although the memorandum was non-binding
and did not provide any details on the expected content of the agreement.
it described broadly what would be addressed during the negotiations.
Further direction was provided by the 2009 MRBB Guidance Document,
which offered an overview of the bilateral agreement process, indicated

51. The purpose of the 2002 NWT Yukon agreement was to cooperatively manage, protect and
conserve the ecological integrity of the aquatic ecosystem of the Mackenzie River Basin while
facilitating sustainable use of the transboundary waters. The successful negotiation of the agreement
has been attributed to the fact that the water resources shared by the two territories are relatively small.
The agreement is therefore only of minor relevance for water management in the north. Overall, it is
hardly ambitious, neither in substantial nor in procedural terms, with shortcomings including imprecise
ecosystem objectives, weak dispute resolution mechanisms, and minimal concern for Aboriginal
interests. See J Owen Saunders, "Managing the Mackenzie: Negotiating a Future with the Basin in
Mfind" (2012) 114 Resources 1 at 4-6, online: The Gordon Foundation <http://gordonfoundation.ca'
publication 651>. Today, the NWT Yukon agreement is considered to be outdated and in need of
revision. See Morris & de Loe, supra note 43. Renegotiation of the agreement is currently underway
See "Transboundary Water Agreements" (2016), online: GNWT <http: www.nwtwaterstewardship.
ca/transboundary>.
52. J Owen Saunders, "Managing Water in a Federal State: The Canadian Experience" in Dustin
Garrick et al, eds, FedcralRivers: Managing Tfater in Hulti-LayeredPoliticalSystems (Cheltenham:
Edward Elgar, 2014) 76 at 84.
53. Peter Clancy, FreshwaterPolitics in Canada(North York: University of Toronto Press, 2014) at
197.

54.

Ibid.

55.

Saunders, supra note 51 at 6-7.
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core issues that should be covered in the agreements, and proposed a
process and timeline for their completion.56
In 2010. the GNWT released its Northern Voices, Northern Waters
Water SIewardship Strategy, which

specified the advancement of

"transboundarv discussions, agreements and obligations" as an important
key to achieving the vision of clean, abundant and productive waters. The
strategy was developed in close collaboration with Aboriginal peoples, and
it apparently gave the NWT new confidence to move negotiations forward,
despite being the ultimate downstream jurisdiction in the Mackenzie River
Basin. While acknowledging that the NWT was "a small jurisdiction
of people, and we are going to be up against some big tables with very
powerful neighbours" the GNWT was "more prepared than ever" to secure
a bilateral agreement with Alberta.
Official negotiations between Alberta, the NWT, and the federal
government began in September 2011. For the negotiations, the parties
agreed to follow an interest-based strategy.5" The goal of this strategy
was to meet the interests of the parties involved while avoiding positional
bargaining. To facilitate the negotiations, the jurisdictions hired the
environmental consulting company Compass Resource Management
Ltd., based in Vancouver. The company has facilitated multiple bilateral
negotiations in the Mackenzie River Basin to allow for a level of
consistency among the various agreements.o
Aboriginal consultations took place separately in the NWTand Alberta.
According to the MRBB GuidanceDocument, "[e]ach MRBB jurisdiction
will engage its Aboriginal organizations in the development of the bilateral
agreements in a manner consistent with its legal obligations."61 The federal
government was initially part of the negotiations, but left in 2014 pursuant
to a devolution agreement, which transferred responsibility for public

56. MRBB, Bilateral Water Management Agreements Guidance Document (2009), online: <www.
mrbb.ca uploads/.. /mrbb-bilateral-guidance_document-final.pdf>; see also Saunders, supra note 51
at 9-10.
57. GNWT, Northern oices, Northern Waters: NWT Water Stiewardship Strategy (2010) at 10, 2526, online: <http://www.enr.gov.nt.ca/sites/default/files/strategies/nwt
water stewardship_strategy.
pdf>>.
58. Michael Miltenberger, NWT Minister of Environment and Natural Resources, quoted in CBC
News, "N.WT. Aims to Sign Water Agreement with Alberta" (5 November 2009), online: <http://
www.cbe.ca news canada north/n-w-t-aims-to-sign-water-agreement-with-alberta- 1.783560>.
59. GNWT, snpra note 51.
60. Compass Resource Management Ltd, "BC and the Northwest Territories Sign Transboundary
Water Agreement" (16 October 2015), online: <http: www.compassrm.com news news pp.php>
61. MRBB, supra note 56 at 7.
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land, water and resource management to the GNWT.6 2 After more than
three years of negotiation, the process was concluded in February 2015.
On 18 March 2015, the Premiers and Environment Ministers of Alberta
and the NWT signed the bilateral water management agreement.6 The
strong desire of the NWT as the ultimate downstream jurisdiction to reach
a bilateral agreement with Alberta apparently was a driving force behind
the successful conclusion of the agreement."
4. The Alberta NWT transboundary water management regime
Together, the 1997 Master Agreement and the 2015 bilateral water
management agreement (and its appendices) constitute the entire regime
between Alberta and the NWT with respect to transboundary waters in the
Mackenzie River Basin.
In general, the principles of the Master Agreement are affirmed in the
bilateral agreement. Its main contribution is filling the broad framework
provided by the Master Agreement with substantive provisions. These
provisions concern surface water quantity, surface water quality,
groundwater, a biological component, and monitoring. In each of these
areas. bilateral water management actions will vary according to the
classification of shared water bodies. Classification (class 1-4) depends
on the level of development and the presence of other stressors and
vulnerabilities affecting a water body (e.g., sensitive water or ecosystem
uses. use conflicts or controversy). Classifications are to be reassessed at
least annually. The classification system is the centrepiece ofthe agreement's
Risk-Informed Management approach, which aims to facilitate joint
learning and proactive, adaptive actions. In procedural terms, the bilateral
agreement establishes a Bilateral Management Committee (BMC), which.,
instead of the MRBB, will be responsible for administering the bilateral
agreement and resolving disputes. Like the MRBB, the BMC will be
composed of government appointees. The bilateral agreement reaffirms
the Master Agreement's commitment to Aboriginal and treaty rights. But
unlike the MRBB, where Aboriginal representation is mandatory, it is
optional on the BMC.
62. On 1 April 2014, the Northiwest Territories Lands and Resources Devolution Agrcentw entered
into force. This agreement included the delegation of various responsibilities related to land and
resources management from the federal government to the GNWT, see Indigenous and Northern
Affairs Canada, "Frequently Asked Questions-Northwest Territories Devolution" (2014), online:
Aboriginal Affairs and Northern Development Canada <https://www.aadne-aandc.ge.caleng/1352470
624114,1352470863709>.
63.
MackenzIe River Basin Bilateral IMater Mangcement -4greementbetween the Govcrnnent of
Alberta and the Governnient of the Northwest Territories (18 March 2015), online: GNWT <http:/
w w w .enr.gov.nt.ca/sites/default/files/ab-nwt wvater management agreement final signed_2.pdf>.
64. Morris & de Loe, supra note 43.
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The NWT perceived the bilateral water management agreement
with Alberta as a big success. According to Michael Miltenberger, who
oversaw the negotiations as the NWT Minister of Environment and
Natural Resources,
We have agreed about all the principle elements, and indicators and
criteria we need across the Basin. We have some very important pieces
built in, in terms of aquatic ecosystems, the amount of water left in the
system, indicators, how we are going to deal with monitoring. At the
same time, we built in a community-based monitoring system that we
have been rolling out across the Northwest Territories that will allow
communities to work with us to sample water....There is a sense of
comfort [in the NWT] that we have the best agreement that we can get
and it gives us a level of protection that we never had before.6 1
Not all of the NWT's demands were incorporated into the agreement,
however. For example, the NWT negotiating team apparently requested
specific objectives for surface water quality, but no such objectives are
spelled out in the agreement or its appendices. While the appendices
recognize that the task of developing specific water quality objectives
is an utmost priority, their development and implementation is said to
require further discussion and resources. The objectives for surface water
quantity, on the other hand, are more specific. In general, the agreement
demands that Alberta passes to the NWT an amount of water equal to the
sum of ecological integrity needs, plus 50 per cent or more of the available
water. For the Hay River, a vulnerable class 3 water body, the objective
is that 90 per cent of instantaneous flows will be allocated for ecosystem
use, and the remaining 10 per cent will be shared equally between Alberta
and the NWT. This water allocation formula was an important success for
the NWT:
When Alberta first came to the table, their offer was 50 per cent of the
water, and we ended up with 95 per cent of the water set aside and
protected for ecosystems and the environment. Most of the other five
per cent will flow into the Northwest Territories, because Alberta won't
use it.66
The NWT-Alberta bilateral agreement was generally well received by
scientists and water experts in Canada, who described it as "an innovative
agreement to share and protect the vast Mackenzie River watershed." and

65. Quoted in The Droplet, "Dream Team Behind the Mackenzie River Basin Agreements" (20
October 2015), online: Water Canada <http://watereanada.net/2015/the-droplet-interview-negotiatingdream-team-behind-the-mackenzie-river-basin-agreements/>.
66. Ibid.
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as setting "a new standard for environmental management."' 17yet , the
agreement also raises several questions. Notably, the agreement's legal
language is weak, and binding, judicial dispute resolution is avoided.,
which raises doubts about the enforceability of the agreement 6" The fact
that monitoring and reporting will be undertaken by the newly established
BMC, instead of the basin-scale MRBB. may further weaken the
board's alreadv limited role. Unless effective coordination mechanisms
are established., this allocation of responsibilities poses challenges to
a bioregional basin governance approach.6 More fundamentally, the
reliance on bilateral agreements has been questioned. As Peter Clancy
views it, this approach
has the effect of shifting focus from the basin as a whole to more
limited tributaries and sub-basins.. .Even witli high-level govemment
commitments to an agreement, the primacy of bilateral relationships
detracts from whole-basin integrity [as] [e]ach jurisdiction concentrates
on immediate borders."
Interesting directions for further research thus emerge about the NWTAlberta agreement itself and its implementation. This paper leaves
these opportunities for future work. In light of Canada's challenges with
Aboriginal involvement, the remainder of this paper concentrates on
a comparative assessment of Aboriginal consultation in the 2011-2015
negotiation process.
III. Aboriginal consultation in Alberta
Within the Govemment of Alberta. responsibility for negotiating the
bilateral agreement rested primarily with the Transboundary Secretariat.
which belongs to Alberta Environmentand Parks. The size ofthe negotiating
team fluctuated due to organizational change. For the most part, however,
the team consisted of four Government of Alberta employees, namely
the director of the Transboundary Secretariat, a negotiations process
coordinator, an intergovernmental relations advisor, and a legal counsel.
Before undertaking Aboriginal consultation on the bilateral water
management agreement, the team requested a pre-consultation assessment
in light of section 35(1) and the duty to consult. According to Brian Yee,
the director of the Transboundary Secretariat, the legal opinion of Alberta

67. The Canadian Press, "Alberta, Northwest Territories Sign Deal on Vast Mackenzie River
Watershed," Macleans (18 March 2015), online: http:// wnacleans.ca news alberta-northwestterritories-nackenzie-river/>.
68. Morris & de Loe, supra notc 43; Interview of J Owen Saunders by Andrea Beck (3 March 2016).
69. Morris & de Loe, supra note 43.
70. Clancy, supra note 53 at 200-201.
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Aboriginal engagement advisors was that the duty to consult was low in
this case, meaning that a letter to Aboriginal peoples may have sufficed
in terms of consultation.!" As indicated by the negotiations process
coordinator, Matthew Pals, the legal opinion meant that "we didn't have
to go out there and do really big, expensive, time-consuming consultation.
It may have been adequate to just send out a notification that we were
entering into these negotiations .... " Obtaining such legal advice was
considered essential by the team to ensure that minimum requirements
were met and legal difficulties avoided. As Yee puts it, "as long as you're
exceeding what's the minimum requirement, it's fine. If you don't meet the
minimum. then you have difficulties."73
For the transboundary negotiation, the team decided that "we wanted
to go above and beyond the bare minimum"?' and Aboriginal groups were
invited to face-to-face information sessions. In deciding which Aboriginal
groups to consult, the team was partly guided by Treaty 8." Some of
the larger Aboriginal groups within the Treaty 8 boundaries include the
Athabasca Chipewyan First Nation and the Mikisew Cree First Nation. A
number of smaller groups were reportedly also invited for consultation.
A concern for compliance with legal requirements again played a role in
determining the inclusiveness of the process:

71. Interview of Brian Yee by Andrea Beck (2 March 2016).
72. Interview of Matthew Pals by Andrea Beck (15 March 2016).
73. Yee, supra note 71. While the written legal opinion was beyond access in this research, Alberta's
most recent consultation guidelines suggest that such a low level of consultation (notification with
opportunity for First Nation to respond) applies when the sensitivity of the project location, based
on treaty rights and traditional uses, is judged to be low, and the impact of the project in question
is expected to be low or moderate. See Alberta Indigenous Relations, The Governnent of,41berta s
Guidelines on Consultationwith FirstNations on Land andNaturalResource Management (2014) at
14, online: <www.indigenous.alberta.ca/documents/First Nations Consultation Guidelines LNRD.
pdfpdf7O.040441057423940774>.
74. Pals, supra note 72.
75. Treaty 8 (1899) is one of II numbered treaties that were negotiated between the Dominion of
Canada and various First Nations between 1871 and 1921. Treaties were most often deemed necessary
within the context of settlement in order to open up land for development. "In essence the treaties
involved the natives extinguishing their 'underlying title' to their land, usually in retum for a variety
of economic and material benefits...." See Huseman & Short. supra note II at 217. Treaty 8 covers
what is today the northern half of Alberta, the area south of Hay River and Great Slave Lake in the
NWT, the northeast quarter of BC, and the northwest corner of Saskatchewan. See Indigenous and
Northem Affairs Canada, "Treaty Guide to Treaty No. 8 (1899)" (2010). online: Aboriginal Affairs
and Northem Development Canada <http: /www.aadnc-aandc.gc.ca eng/1100100028805/110010002
8807>.
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We tried to be as inclusive as possible. For the most part, we wanted
to err on the side of caution. If we were on the fence about whether or
not this group should be consulted with, then we decided that yes, let's
consult with them, just to be safe. 6
In an invitation letter (dated 9 May 2012) sent to the Mikisew Cree
First Nation. Alberta announced several half-day information sessions,
intended to provide First Nations with an opportunity to ask questions
about the bilateral agreements, and to provide feedback on an information
package. This information package, enclosed with the letter. offered
background information on the bilateral water management agreements, a
summary of Alberta's interests informed by the province's Water for Life
Strateg,"' and an overview of channels for First Nations to provide input.
Specifically, the letter invited First Nations to three information sessions:
one in Fort McMurray on 30 May, one in Peace River on 5 June, and
one in High Level on 6 June 2012. All three sessions would take place
in conference centres or hotels." On its website, Alberta Environment
and Parks later reported about two of these meetings. As stated on the
website, these sessions "provided information on the bilateral agreements,
an update on the overall agreement development processes to date, and
provided an opportunity for First Nations to identify their concerns and
interests related to the bilaterals." 9
To these meetings, the negotiating team "just went there to listen.
We were gathering information, trying to get a handle on what different
groups' concerns were."so Translators were not present at the meetings,
since apparently all attendees spoke English. According to Pals,
translation "would be something we would have pursued if there was a
need for it.""' The Aboriginal consultation sessions took place separately,
but proceeded in parallel with meetings with municipalities and industry.
These stakeholders were also engaged to make sure that the negotiations
covered 'all Albertans' interests, Indigenous peoples and otherwise." 2

.

76. Pals, supra note 72.
77. Alberta Environment and Parks, Water fbr Lite: Alberia' Strategy for Suinability (2003),
online: Government of Alberta <https://extranet.gov.ab.ca env/ infocentre info/library 6190pdf
78. Alberta Environment and Sustainable Resource Development, Invitalion Letter andiAppendices
to ihevfikisew Cree FirstNation, May 9, 2012 (2012) Personal Communication (8 April 2016).
79. Alberta Environment and Parks, "Mackenzie River Basin Bilateral Water Management
Agreements" (2015), online: <littp: /esrd.alberta.ca/water education-guidelines/mackenzie-riverbasin-bilateral-water-management-agreements.aspx>.
80. Pals, supra note 72.
81. Ibid.
82. Ibid.
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Although this research could obtain no direct insights into the
Aboriginal information sessions, a written draft submission prepared by
a consultant for the Athabasca Chipewyan First Nation and the Mikisew
Cree First Nation highlights a number of Aboriginal priorities for the
bilateral water management agreements. 3 Several of the priorities are
specifically directed at the agreement that Alberta is currently negotiating
with BC. These concern, among other things, seasonal distribution of flow,
consumptive use, and water quality. However, the draft submission also
contains a number of more general priorities relevant to the NWT-Alberta
agreement. In substantive terms, these include the prohibition of bulk
water removals from the basin, prevention of introducing foreign biota and
pathogens into the basin, establishment of quantity and quality objectives
for joint aquifers and precautionary measures to ensure their protection,
and joint consideration of adaptive measures. Procedurally, the document
calls for the creation of a basin-level governance structure with binding
decision making powers to ensure ecological integrity, harmonization and
enforcement of relevant laws and regulations in the basin jurisdictions,
full respect for Aboriginal rights in the bilateral agreements, and a
joint commitment to values and objectives such as protection of future
generations, protection of traditional ways of life, and decision making
based on traditional, local, and Western knowledge."
After Alberta's initial interest gathering phase in May and June 2012.,
no further consultation was undertaken until January 2015, when a draft
agreement had been developed. With this draft, the negotiating team went
back to Aboriginal groups for follow-up consultation. These sessions were
intended to allow for communication feedback, showing the groups to what
extent and how their concerns had been accommodated. As emphasized
by team members, these sessions did no longer constitute information
gathering, but were instead a form of information sharing: "We went back
and shared with them where we ended up., not for their pemlission or
their blessing, but just to show them. this is where we have ended up, and
this is how we've addressed your concerns."" In these sessions, the team
"provided them [the Aboriginal groups] with tables of how the interests
they have expressed were addressed in the agreement or not addressed, for
whatever reason.""

83. "MCFN and ACFN Bilateral Water Agreement Priorities" (2012) Personal Communication (8
April 2016).
84. Ibid.
85. Pals, supra note 72.
86. Yee, supra note 71.
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While Aboriginal groups in Alberta thus had opportunities for
providing input at the outset ofthe negotiations, they did not have influence
over the ways in which their concerns affected the subsequent negotiations
and the resulting agreement. To some extent, this circumstance reflects
Alberta's most recent consultation policy, which explicitly states that
"[t]he Crown's duty to consult does not give First Nations...a veto over
Crown decisions, nor is the consent of First Nations... required as part of
Alberta's consultation process.""
One ofthe reasons why some Aboriginal concerns were leftunaddressed
is because these concerns were perceived to be outside the scope of the
bilateral agreement. According to the negotiating team. First Nations
apparently were less concerned about water management in the NWT. since
it is located downstream from Alberta. Rather, concerns seemed to focus
on upstream dam operations in BC and oil sands operations in Alberta,
and their impacts on the Peace-Athabasca Delta. From a governmental
perspective, however, "the Peace-Athabasca Delta, being located wholly
within the borders of Alberta, is more accurately addressed through
regional planning done within the province of Alberta, than through any
kind of interjurisdictional agreement...." Thus, Aboriginal groups "had
concerns in general with water in the Mackenzie River Basin. However,
it wasn't always within the scope of the agreement."" In such cases,
the team tried to direct Aboriginal groups to Alberta's land use regional
planning process as the proper forum to voice their concerns. Yet, team
members also acknowledged that First Nations may have preferred the
bilateral negotiations as an opportunity to have their concerns addressed
sooner due to the slow pace of regional planning.8 9
The above-mentioned draft submission prepared for First Nations
confirms that several of their concerns may indeed have focused on
transboundary water management with upstream BC, rather than with
downstream NWT`U More general Aboriginal concerns related to bulk
water removal, invasive species control, and adaptive management seem
to have been addressed in the bilateral agreement. However, instead of
establishing a basin-level governance mechanism, as requested by First
Nations. the BMC moves away from a basin-wide approach and lacks
binding decision-making powers. Likewise, as noted above, while

87. Alberta Indigenous Relations, The Government of Albertas Policy on Consultation with
Firs Nations on Land and Natural Resource Management, 2013 (2013) at 4. online: htp://www.
indigenous.alberta.ca/documents/GOAPolicv-FNConsultation-2013.pdf>.
88. Pals, supra note 72.

89.
90.

bid.
"MCFN and ACFN Bilateral Water Agreement Priorities," supra note 83.
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Aboriginal and treaty rights are affirmed in the bilateral agreement,
Aboriginal representation on the BMC is not mandatory but optional.
One of the challenges perceived by Alberta during consultations
concerned First Nations capacity. Generally, it was observed that many
groups were facing consultation overload: "there is a requirement to
consult on so many different files that some groups get overwhelmed
and overloaded.. ."9 A certain "consultation fatigue" was also observed,
which may have arisen since "some groups have participated in other
consultations in the past, and either didn't see their concerns addressed, or
that communication feedback was not there....
Some efforts were made
by the negotiating team to remediate these shortcomings, for example
by directing groups to alternative consultation channels and engaging
in followv-up information sharing. How\ever, capacity building was not
undertaken directly by the Transboundarv Secretariat, since in Alberta,
this responsibility lies with a separate Aboriginal Consultation Office."
Another major challenge facing the negotiating team was to manage
expectations. For the Government ofAlberta, the NWT-Alberta agreement
was intended to be "a friendly, cooperative agreement that sets out how two
jurisdictions are going to work together to manage our shared waters." 9 4
Apparently, this interpretation did not necessarily align with Aboriginal
expectations:
I think there was some hope by some groups that we would be able to
use this agreement to influence or control water management decisions
in otherjurisdictions, and that was never the intent of the agreements...
because they [other jurisdictions] are responsible for their natural
resources, and we [Alberta] are responsible for ours."
This emphasis on provincial ownership of natural resources goes back
to the 1930 Natural Resources Transfer Agreements,96 which moved
ownership ofwater and other natural resources from the federal government
to provincial govermnents. Based on this legislation, the Government of
Alberta takes the position that "water belongs to Alberta and we manage
the water at the provincial level." 9" In the negotiations with the NWT,
91. Pals, supra note 72.
92. Ibid.
93. Alberta Indigenous Relations, supra note 87 at 5.
94. Pals, supra note 72.
95. Ibid.
96. AlberiaNatural ResourcesAct, SCA 1930, c 3, which is also regarded as the Ntural Resources
Transfer Agreement. See J Owen Saunders & Michael M Wenig, "Whose Water? Canadian Water
Management and the Challenges of Jurisdictional Fragmentation" in Karen Bakker, ed, Eau Canada:
The Future ofCanadas (Water (Vancouver: U1C Press, 2007) 119 at 124, 139.
97. Yee, supra note 71.
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Alberta's emphasis on natural resource sovereignty was reflected in interjurisdictional interaction:
We had to remind NWT more than once of the principles of the Master
Agreement, especially about the part that jurisdictions have the right to
use water, and manage the use of that water, as long as w e don't cause
unreasonable harm to the downstream jurisdiction. We had to remind
them, "Do not try to step on Alberta's sovereignty with respect to
management of water aid decision making.""
Considerations for natural resource sovereignty also affected Aboriginal
involvement. For the Government of Alberta, the negotiations were to
be government-to-goverment, and the presence of other actors at the
negotiating table was firmly rejected. While First Nations were consulted.
"[i]n the negotiations themselves, Aboriginal groups played zero role.
They didn't play any role because the agreement itself was between two
governments."9 While Alberta was approached by Aboriginal groups to
sit at the table, "we said that no, the agreement is between governments,
and only govemments will be sitting at the table....""' Notably, the term
"governments" in Alberta usage only refers to provincial., territorial and
federal authorities, not Aboriginal groups.
IV Aboriginal consultation in the Northwest Territories
In the NWT, the transboundary water negotiations were the responsibility
of the Department of Environment and Natural Resources. As mentioned,
the Minister at the time was Michael Miltenberger., who was in office
over the course of the entire 2011-2015 negotiation and had earlier
played a crucial role in championing the Water Stewardship Strategy. For
bilateral negotiations with Alberta and other neighbouring jurisdictions,
Miltenberger assembled a team of nine, which included both GNWT
employees and externally-hired experts. Overall., the team consisted
of a chief negotiator; lead negotiator and technical advisor; NWT and
Aboriginal affairs advisor; negotiations process advisor: negotiations
coordinator; water quantity specialist: water quality specialist: technical
coordinator: and a transboundarv consultation support person.
As suggested by team members, land claims agreements provided a
strong legal obligation for Aboriginal consultation in the NWT because
one crucial provision in the Gwich'in, Sahtu and Tlicho Comprehensive
Land Claim Agreements requires that "waters which are on or flow through
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or are adjacent to [Gw'ich'in, Sahtu, Tlicho] lands remain substantially
unaltered as to quality, quantity and rate of flow.""0 This clause has been
adopted as one of the goals of the Water StewardshipStrategy, envisioning
that "[w]aters that flow into., within or through the NWT are substantially
unaltered in quality, quantity and rates of flow."o2 According to Ralph
Pentland, who served as the negotiations process advisor, this sentence
was a very powerful guiding principle.... We had a lot of interests in
the NWT, but they all could be translated into that one sentence, which
essentially refers to the protection of an Aboriginal lifestyle. In a way,
that was strong marching orders for us as negotiators.'03
As noted by Erin Kelly, the lead negotiator and technical advisor, because
of the wording in the land claims agreements, "we were unable and
unwilling to commit to less than that standard."' 04 For Aboriginal groups
in the NWT, these agreements provided strong legal recourse in the case
of inadequate consultation. Tim Heron, who represented the NWT Metis
Nation during the consultation. makes the Aboriginal perspective clear:
There are legal avenues such as land claims which are constitutionally
protected. There are water clauses in there. The territorial government
can't just come along., make a deal and say. "Oh. we forgot all you guys
down the river." Aboriginal rights are always in our hip pocket. This
deal [NWT-Alberta bilateral water management agreement] is not for
Aboriginal people. It's for territorial and provincial governments. But
we could go to court anytime we want. It's like sitting there with a trunp
card in your pocket and not playing it until you need it."

This legal basis played a significant role in shaping consultation efforts in
the NWT. The negotiating team tried to consult with Aboriginal groups
early and to keep them involved throughout all stages of interest-based
negotiations:
Our intention was to begin dialogue very early in the process. We wanted
to make sure that the concerns could be understood early, and that the
process and outcomes could better address Aboriginal government
101. GNWT, supra note 51; Comprehensive Land Claim Agreement between Her Majesty the Queen
in Right of Canada and the Gwich'in as represented by the Gwich'in Tribal Council, Volume 1, [1992]
R32-121/1992E at para 19.1.8(a); Sahtu Dene and Mlfetis Comprehensive Land Claim Agreement,

olume I, [1993] R32-146/1993E at para 20.1.8(a); Land Claims and Self'Government Agreement
among the Tlicho and the Government of the Northwest Territories and the Government of Canada,

[2003] at para 21.2.3.
102. GTNWT, supra note 57 at 11.
103. Interview of Ralph Pentland by Andrea Beck (21 January 2016).
104. Interview of Erin Kelly by Andrea Beck (8 February 2016).
105. Interview of Tin Heron by Andrea Beck (9 March 2016).
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interests from the beginning. This is a very different approach than just
going at the end with the agreement back to people, and explaining why
things were there. We were trying to engage in conversation throughout
the negotiations process.106
Aboriginal consultations on the bilateral water management agreements
officially began in March 2012 with a letter from Miltenberger, which
was sent to regional Aboriginal governments and invited them to
provide comments and input on NWT principles and interests."o These
consultations were a continuation of close Aboriginal engagement in the
development and implementation of the Water Stewardship Strategy.,
which started much earlier, in 2006/2007.10s
Face-to-face meetings were an important part of the consultation
process, which began in 2012 and continued over the course of the
following three years. As internal GNWT records show. between
March 2012 and January 2015, 77 meetings were held with Aboriginal
communities and representatives across the NWT from Fort Smith and
Yellowknife in the south to Fort McPherson and Inuvik in the north.
Some of these meetings were exclusively focused on the NWT-Alberta
agreement, while others dealt with the agreements with BC, Saskatchewan
or Yukon. However, as indicated in the governmental records, all meetings
involved at least updates and some discussion on the NWT-Alberta
bilateral agreement. Types of meetings included meetings with individual
Aboriginal communities, Aboriginal leadership meetings, and regional
mectings. Thev also included traditional knowledge workshops, as "[o]
ur aim was to ensure from the beginning that traditional knowledge was
being meaningfully included in the negotiation process."1 09
As described by the chief negotiator, Merrell-Ann Phare, communitybased meetings generally occurred in the community s main meeting
place, such as a school gymnasium or community hall. Translators were
always present at the meetings, both out of necessity and out of respect:
We always had provided the option of translators, as it's not unusual
for Elders to only speak their Indigenous language. Sometimes, they
speak both English and the Indigenous language. And it's also an issue
of respect, where you must recognize that the Indigenous language is
important1 no
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Aboriginal members were invited to give anAboriginal opening prayer and
sometimes acted as co-chairs. During the meetings, which usually lasted
between one and two days, members of the negotiating team and GNWT
staff typically showed slide presentations to share background information
on the negotiations and to provide updates. The rest of the meetings
was then reserved for answering questions and providing feedback. As
indicated by the NWT team. dialogue and conversation was an important
characteristic of meetings with Aboriginal communities:
We would say what we knew and have conversations about what input
they would like to provide. The meeting participants were always invited
to provide opening remarks, and ask questions throughout, and have
discussions."

Questions from Aboriginal members were not only answered on the spot,
but questions and answers were also recorded into summaries by GNWT
staff. The team then "'always responded in writing after these meetings....
Sometimes, the responses were very elaborate-30, 40, 50 pages written
of responses."" This material provided the basis for the team to ensure
that Aboriginal concerns were considered in the negotiations.
However, the NWT's multi-pronged approach to consultations was
not confined to community-based and regional meetings alone. Additional
consultation mechanisms included the NWT and Aboriginal affairs advisor
(referred to as the "Aboriginal liaison person" by interviewees) and the
Aboriginal Steering Committee (ASC)." 3 The NWT and Aboriginal affairs
advisor was an Aboriginal representative who was part of the negotiating
team and present at all negotiating sessions. This person's task was to
serve as a conduit between the negotiating team and Aboriginal interests:
When we were negotiating, the Aboriginal liaison person would talk to
all the Aboriginal governments up and down the valley throughout the
NWT about the issues in the water negotiations. And then, the liaison
would bring back their views into our negotiating meetings.... This was
one function of the liaison with Aboriginal governments: explain to them
what we were thinking, and explain to us what they were thinking."
The ASC, for its part, consisted of representatives from NWT regional
and community-based Aboriginal governments. The formation of the
Committee dates back to 2009, when it was established to help guide
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the development of the Water Stewardship Strategy." As documented in
GNWT records, between March 2012 and February 2015, the ASC met
eleven times in Yellowknife or via teleconference to discuss progress on
the bilateral agreements. For the negotiating team, this close interaction
provided a mechanism to keep negotiations aligned with Aboriginal
interests., as the ASC "did a very good job of continually looking over our
shoulders and making sure we remained true to 'thcir' [Water Stewardship]
Strategy. "116 The high level of interaction was also acknowledged by
Aboriginal representatives:
The negotiating team always talked to the Aboriginal Steering Conmlittee,
which would make sure that the GNWT was on the right path, based on
what it says in the Water Strateg .... There was a lot of talking going on
when this was happening."In implementing this multi-faceted consultation approach, the NWT
negotiating team recognized the need for capacity building:
Indigenous peoples in particular have the need for resourcing support,
either because they don't have a strong revenue base or they have so
many priorities....They need financial support in order to get staff, or
technical people, or to have a community process to find out what their
input is. Normally, you would expect that when two governments come
to the table, each funds themselves. But that's not the case generally
with Indigenous governments. It might not be always like that, but
it's certainly frequenitl like that right now, where they are just underresourced in general, and will need support."'
During consultations, capacity support was provided in two main ways.
First, capacity building took place directly during meetings with Aboriginal
groups as a result of the team's commitment "to spend the time to talk
them through every single line of the agreement, and make sure that the
full implications of every element was fully discussed and understood."1 1 9
Also, the GNWT provided funding for meetings, the NWT and Aboriginal
affairs advisor., and the ASC. Overall, it has been estimated that the GNWT
spent $1.6 million per year on the bilateral water negotiation wvith Alberta,' 20
with consultations accounting for a considerable share. In the eyes of the

115. GNWT, supra note 57 at 43.
116. Ralph Pentland, Comments at Celebratory Dinner, NWT Alberta Bilateral Water Management
Agreement, Sepemher 17, 2015, Yelloiwknite (2015) Personal Communication (21 January 2016).
117. Heron, supra note 105.
118. Phare, supra note 110.
119. bid.
120. The Canadian Press, supra note 67.
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negotiating team, these financial resources spent on consultation were an
investment in a long-temi relationship:

'

it was expensive, but that is how you build a long-term relationship.
And it means you are not spending money in court, you are not spending
money fighting, and you are actually working closely together to get
things done.' 2
Second, capacity building occurred indirectly through the Action Plan
2011 2015. This plan is intended to help put the Water Stewardship
Strategy into practice. It includes a variety of initiatives such as communitybased monitoring, which aims at empowering communities to become
involved in water-related research, monitoring, and traditional knowledge
collection. 22
With respect to the status of Aboriginal groups in the NWT, it is
noteworthy that GNWT officials and staff, as well as externally-hired team
members, tended to refer to Aboriginal groups as governments:
We need to deal with Aboriginal governments in a respectful way.
And don't be afraid of the word "'Aboriginal governments." We have
municipal govenments, we have provincial govennents, territorial
governents-and they all work together. 123
We had to involve Indigenous governments at each stage, if we wanted
the agreement to represent the views of the governments of the north.
You can't say it only represents the GNWT's views if we had agreed
to work in partnership, and the Indigenous governuents are as valid a
govenment as any other government.124
This recognition notwithstanding., some disagreements arose between the
negotiating team and Aboriginal groups, in particular about the level of
involvement as well as the impact on the final agreement. Some Aboriginal
groups reportedly requested to have a seat at the table with Alberta, beyond
the NWT and Aboriginal affairs advisor. Such direct participation was
unfeasible from the negotiating team's viewpoint, and tensions emerged
between control of the negotiations and appropriate involvement:
The one big challenge that kept arising almost all the time, at every

meeting, was the level of involvement. What the Aboriginal groups
would have liked would be to sit at the table and negotiate with Alberta.

121. Phare, supra note 110.
122. GNWT, NWT Water Stewardship:A PlanfobrAcion 2011-2015 (2011), online: <http: /www.enr.
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So how do you get an appropriate level of involvement? . . You can't
take each Aboriginal government to the negotiations. When you go to
the negotiating table, you have two or three people on each side that are
going to speak. If you have more than that, then you are really in trouble.
You've got to control the negotiations. but at the same time, you have to
2
have appropriate involvement.1 1

Due to their concerns about upstream development, Aboriginal groups in
the NWT also demanded that stronger legal enforcement mechanisms be
included in the bilateral agreement:
[They] wanted the agreement to be another layer of regulation. They
really wanted it to be a binding contract that created penalties and a new
course of action for litigation.... But the governments had agreed to a
cooperative approach through the Master Agreement as an additional
way to achieve common goals.'2
On the one hand, Aboriginal groups were thus recognized as governments
and fill partners in the NWT. On the other hand, it was the territorial and
provincial governments who reserved for themselves the prerogative to
sit at the negotiating table, and who had the final say over the agreement's
procedural and substantive provisions. In contrast to demands by
Aboriginal groups in both the NWT and Alberta, the final agreement
lacks strong enforcement mechanisms. The major substantive goal of
Aboriginal peoples in the NWT (and arguably also the GNWT) was to
ensure that waters remained "substantially unaltered," but this wording did
not enter into the bilateral agreement. Rather, the Master Agreement's "no
unreasonable harm" principle was maintained. As noted by Peter Clancy.
"no unreasonable harm" and "substantially unaltered" "represent distinct
and colliding principles for freshwater management...." The fact that the
Master Agreement's wording prevailed suggests that the NWT-Alberta
agreement does not set a creative precedent., but "simply perpetuate[s] the
balance of political forces to date." 2 7
V. Discussion
In sum, the foregoing analysis offers a nuanced answer to the question
of whether consultations in the NWT-Alberta transboundary water
negotiation can be regarded as an outstanding achievement from the
perspective of FPIC. Fundamentally, two separate consultative processes
were underway during the 2011-2015 negotiation. While this research

125. Pentland, supra note 103.
126. Phare, supra note 110.
127. Clancy, supra note 53 at 202.
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detected no indications of restrictions on the freedom of Aboriginal groups
in either Alberta or the NWT. important differences emerge between the
two cases in light of the other evaluative criteria.
Regarding timing and duration, formal consultations in both
jurisdictions began in the first half of 2012. In Alberta, the information
gathering phase was limited to May and June 2012. and no further
consultation took place until 2015. when a draft agreement had been
developed. In the NWT, Aboriginal peoples were consulted continually
throughout the entire negotiation period. Although official consultation
on the bilaterals began in March 2012, Aboriginal engagement on waterrelated issues in the territory dated back much further, to the development
of the Water Stewardship Strategy. In this sense, consultation began a
long time priorto the start of official bilateral negotiations. Whereas the
sharing of information in Alberta was confined to a notification package
and a small number of meetings, the GNWT undertook an extensive,
multi-pronged consultation effort, where information was made available
through various channels. At community-based meetings in the NWT,
Indigenous language translation was provided, both out of necessity and
out of respect. Dialogue and collaboration played an important role in
interactions between the negotiating team and Aboriginal communities
and their representatives. GNWT capacity building supported Aboriginal
peoples to play a meaningful role in consultations, and encouraged them
to take on leadership roles in community-based monitoring and traditional
knowledge collection. NWT policy makers and negotiating team members
also emphasized the special status of Aboriginal groups as governments.
The nature and scope of Aboriginal consultation thus appears to have
been different and significantly "deeper"'12 in the NWT as compared to

Alberta. Nevertheless, it is noteworthy that Aboriginal groups were denied
access to the negotiating table on either side. although the GNWT made
an effort to enhance direct Aboriginal participation through the NWT and
Aboriginal affairs advisor. While the exclusion of Aboriginal actors in
Alberta was mainly due to sovereignty-related concerns, interviewees in
the NWT cited logistical difficulties,129 and, to some extent, resistance by
Alberta,13 as the main reasons for lack of direct access. Accommodation
of Aboriginal substantive and procedural concerns likewise reached a
limit when demands challenged the previously agreed upon friendly,
cooperative nature of the agreement. Contrary to Brooks's suggestion that

128. Haida Nation, supra note 18 at para 44.
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the agreement "was signed between Alberta, the Northwvest Territories,
and all affected indigenous groups..."131 the analy sis shows that although
Aboriginal groups were consulted they were not a party or signatory to the
bilateral water management agreement.
While Alberta's consultations were oriented towards legal minimum
requirements under the duty to consult, the NWT implemented extensive
consultations characterized by early involvement, multi-faceted
engagement, emphasis on dialogue and collaboration, capacity building,
and recognition of Aboriginal groups as govemments. Although certain
shortcomings in Aboriginal access and accommodation remained when
measured against the standard of FPIC, it can be argued that these
characteristics qualify the NWT case as an unusual achievement in terms
of Aboriginal consultation in Canada. As suggested by Miltenberger, the
consultation and accommodation efforts undertaken in the NWT indirectly
also benefited Aboriginal groups in Alberta, and partly account for the fact
that some of their substantive interests were incorporated into the final
agreement:
As Aboriginal governments from northern Alberta told us, they can't get
to the table with their government, but they knew from their relationships
with the Aboriginal governments in the NWT and tie GNWT that we
negotiated an agreement that we all accepted would be good for them as
well. The protection of the water, the monitoring issues, the conditions
required to maintain integrity of the water all would benefit them....
But they were still frustrated that they didn't have the same kind of
relationship with their government that we have with the Aboriginal
governments in the NWT.1

2

Not only is the NWT case a major step forward in light of Canada's
past consultation record, but it also constitutes a proactive attempt to
enhance Aboriginal participation in line with FPIC. Legal considerations
under the duty to consult-in particular, land claims agreements and the
expected impacts on Aboriginal lifestyles in the NWT as the downstream
jurisdiction-affected the nature and scope of consultation. But beyond
those legal requirements, FPIC was not far from the minds of GNWT
officials and team members when describing Aboriginal consultation:

131. Brooks, supra note 14 at 1077.
132. Miltenberger, supra note 123.
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We are working in many of our initiatives through this whole process
of prior and informed consent. and making sure that the Aboriginal
governments are involved at the front end of everything that we have
going on in the NWT, because they are major players. 133
In a recent report prepared by Phare and Miltenberger, the GNWT's
approach to consultation and accommodation, called "collaborative
consent," is explicitly situated within the context of UNDRIP and
FPIC. As noted in the report, collaborative consent is a process "where
all governments-Indigenous and non-Indigenous-work to achieve
each other's consent through collaborative approaches tailored to the
matter at hand." Initiatives to involve Aboriginal governments in the codevelopment of legislation, policies, and agreements are cited as examples
of how this approach is being put into practice in the NWT.'
Besides legal considerations, socio-political relationships emerged
as an important factor to explain differences in Aboriginal consultation.
Consultation inAlberta took place in a climate where relationships between
the provincial government and First Nations had become increasingly
acrimonious. Due to frustration among First Nations about the lack of
meaningful consultation on resource development, relationships had
deteriorated to the extent of a "fundamental breakdown."' By contrast.,
Aboriginal and non-Aboriginal segments of society have traditionally
been closely interwoven in the NWT:
We recognized early on that we are all related here, that most of us have
been here a long time. We have Inuvialuit, Dene people, Metis, nonAboriginals, connected by blood lines and family relationships. These
kinds of connections are very common here. It only makes sense that
we figure out a way to get along, so that we can have political peace.' 36
The fact that 51.9 per cent of the NWT population has an Aboriginal
identity, compared with only 6.2 per cent in Alberta and 4.3 per cent of
the total Canadian population, 3 7 has likewise been cited as an important
reason for strong Aboriginal involvement:
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134. Phare Law Corporation & North Raven, Collaborative Consent: A Nation-to-Nation Path to
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The motivation comes from the fact that half of the population of the
NWT is Aboriginal. And probably, at any given time, half of the Cabinet,
half of the representatives in government are Indigenous. So you don't
have this idea that Indigenous people are "the other." The Indigenous
people are "us." There is no way that you could exist in the north without
recognizing the important role of Indigenous people and Indigenous

governments.138
Miltenberger, whose political leadership was a driving force behind the
bilateral agreement, identifies as Metis. During his terms in office, he
advocated, among otherthings, for a stronger role ofAboriginal peoples and
traditional knowledge in northem water management.1 3 9 The backgrounds
of leading members on the NWT negotiating team likewise reflect a
concern for Aboriginal issues. The externally-hired chief negotiator has
been a strong proponent of Aboriginal water rights in Canada, 4 0 and
the GNWT lead negotiator is the main author of two highly influential
studies documenting the detrimental effects of oil sands operations on the
Athabasca River, including human and environmental health impacts.1" 1
Even more fundamentally, differences between Aboriginal consultation
in Alberta and the NWT can be attributed to the sharply dividing effect of
the provincial-territorial border along the 60th parallel. This observation
may at first seem trivial from a Western perspective, but the consequences
for Aboriginal peoples are far-reaching. The NWT-Alberta border, and
other colonial borders, split the basin into individual jurisdictions that
manage water and consult with Aboriginal peoples according to their
respective legal and policy frameworks. This fragmented approach runs
counter to more holistic Aboriginal perceptions of the basin. According
to Tim Heron, "[to us, the boundaries are only a figment of the federal
government's imagination, because only governments see the borders."1 4 2
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The former Grand Chief of the Deh Cho First Nations, Samuel Gargan,
likewise emphasized Aboriginal peoples' collective approach to the basin:
As First Nations, we take our views collectively. There are no boundaries
between us. We try to address issues for the people downstream by those
people upstream that can actually try and see if they can stop things from
occurring....The border is not there as far as we are concerned... We get
together and say, this is the land of our ancestors that we need to protect.
The air we breathe we need to protect, the water we drink we need to
protect, and the wildlife that we depend on we need to protect. And
collectively, we say that we have to do everything possible to do that 143
The provincial-territorial border serves as the main demarcation for
govermments in defining their natural resource rights and consultation
obligations. Yet, it fundamentally conflicts with Aboriginal perspectives
and worldviews. This tension strongly resonates with the recent findings
of Nonman, who illuminates the mismatch between colonial borders and
traditional Indigenous homelands in Canada-U.S. transboundarv water
govermance. 14 4
VI. hanslatingFPICfrom an internationalnorm to a domestic template
for action
A one size fits all approach to Aboriginal consultation does not exist in
Canada. Flexibility and adaptability are important to account for specific
circumstances and the diverse cultures and traditions of Aboriginal
communities.145 However, with water-related struggles between Aboriginal
and Canadian govemments itensifying-most acutely with respect
to oil sands operations in Alberta and hydro-development in BC-the
Mackenzie experience holds important lessons for policy makers trying
to work toward more collaborative and reconciliatory relationships with
Aboriginal peoples. As newly elected govemments at the federal and
provincial levels are looking for ways of renewing Canada's relationship
with its Aboriginal population, the NWT case can provide the basis for
formulating useful pragmatic advice on how to translate FPIC from a
intemational norm to a domestic template for action.
Recent research into collaborative water governance and water policy
reform in BC has already generated important recommendations in this
regard."'These recommendations speak to the importance of approaching
and involving Indigenous peoples as self-determining nations; choosing
143.
144.
145.
146.

Interview of Samuel Gargan by Andrea Beck (8 March 2016).
Norman, supra note 13.
Matiation & Boudreau, supra note 30 at 440; Sterling & Landmann, supra note 26 at 11.
Von der Porten et al, supra note 37.

Aboriginal Consultation in Canadian Water Negotiations:
The Mackenzie Bilateral Water Management Agreements

521

venues and decision-making processes that reflect Indigenous instead
of Western approaches; supporting Indigenous peoples through capacity
building; and creating opportunities for relationship building between
Indigenous and non-Indigenous actors. This paper underscores these
recommendations, and additionally identifies the following key aspects to
realizing FPIC in the Canadian context.
1. Devising multi-faceted consultation strategies
Achieving direct access to water negotiations remains an important goal
for Aboriginal peoples. Even if such access is unfeasible due to political
or logistical challenges, governments should make their best efforts to
allow for the greatest possible extent of Aboriginal participation. The
provision of written information and face-to-face meetings have become
rather common (if not always well -implemented) consultation tools. The
NWT case demonstrates that alternative mechanisms-such as the NWT
and Aboriginal affairs advisor and the ASC-are available to supplement
and enhance these tools. By adopting a multi-faceted consultation
strategy, governments can strengthen Aboriginal engagement and provide
Aboriginal peoples with multiple channels to make their voices heard.
In designing and implementing such strategies, close attention should be
paid to adequate representation of diverse and heterogeneous Aboriginal
interests, as well as to the availability of suficient capacity support.
2. Providingmeaningfd possibilitiesfor accommodation
The most participatory process is meaningless without opportunities for
Aboriginal peoples to impact the results of decision making. As suggested
above, the consultations undertaken by the GNWT meant that a great deal
(if not all) of the Aboriginal interests could be accommodated in the final
agreement. Yet certain matters, such as stronger enforcement mechanisms,
staved off limits. Generally speaking, more process per se only means
mounting costs for both, governments and Aboriginal peoples. In addition,
it may further alienate the latter from engaging in consultations, especially
when consultation fatigue already exists and consultations are perceived
as mere tick-box exercises. Only more procedure with the possibility for
accommodation is a desirable goal from an Aboriginal perspective. Even
if FPIC may not imply a veto right, governments should try to negotiate
towards consent. Among other things, this means involving Aboriginal
peoples from the very beginning, and engaging in consultations in good
faith with the intention of adjusting the substance of decision making
according to Aboriginal concerns.
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3. Investing in long-term relationshipbuilding,
Rather than approaching relationship building as an ad hoc, instrumental
exercise tied to a specific project or program, governments should make a
serious commitment to continuously build awareness, understanding, and
trust with Aboriginal peoples. In the NWT case, Aboriginal consultation
on the bilateral water management agreement benefited considerablv from
long-standing prior engagement, which has been embedded in an array of
water- as well as non-water-related initiatives."7 Investments in long-temi
relationship building can help avoid lengthy and costly legal battles, and
lay the foundation for collaboration and reconciliation in the future.
4. PromotingAboriginal networks and leadership
As this research has shown, Aboriginal peoples have maintained a close
network within the Mackenzie River Basin. This network not only crosses,
but truly transcends boundaries between provinces and territories, upstream
and downstream jurisdictions, and humans and nature. This holistic view
of the basin stands in contrast with the interjurisdictional and sovereigntybased approach adopted by provincial and territorial govemments. By
supporting, rather than suppressing or ignoring, Aboriginal networks
in a basin, policy makers can create invaluable opportunities for more
integrated approaches to transboundary water governance. In this regard,
govermments should go beyond incorporating Aboriginal actors and
knowledge into existing policy regimes, and instead encourage genuine
collaboration and Aboriginal leadership. Establishing community-based
monitoring programs under the leadership of Aboriginal peoples could
be one promising entry point in this regard. Further inspiration for
initiatives aimed at questioning and expanding notions of territoriality and
sovereignty could be drawn from Nomian's five parables of change. These
show how Indigenous peoples along the Canada-U.S. border have engaged
in innovative, counter-hegemonic strategies to reshape and enhance water
management and environmental protection. As the examples of the Coast
Salish Gathering or the Great Lakes water walkers demonstrate, these
initiatives have not only achieved more effective water governance, but
have also contributed to the strengthening of Indigenous self-determination,
decolonialization, cultural revitalization, and empowerment.1 48
Conclusion
This paper has presented a comparative analysis ofAboriginal consultations
in the 2011-2015 Mackenzie water negotiation between Alberta and the
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NWT. It has found that consultative approaches differed markedly in the
two jurisdictions, with possible explanations including divergent legal
considerations, differences in socio-political relationships, and the effects
of colonial borders.
Comparing this finding with experiences from other ongoing
consultations and negotiations in the Mackenzie River Basin could firther
clarify the causal effects of these explanatory factors. Furthermore., an
examination of Aboriginal consultation in Alberta's ongoing negotiation
with BC-where Alberta is the downstream jurisdiction-may shed
light on the ways in which upstream-downstream considerations affect
Aboriginal consultation in transboundary water negotiations. Another
key opportunity for further investigation concerns the role that Aboriginal
peoples will play in the implementation of the bilateral water management
agreements, in particular with respect to the BMCs.
Most importantly, this paper adds to a growing body of research
on Aboriginal consultation, and reveals several recommendations for
policy makers seeking to implement FPIC in the Canadian context.
These recommendations highlight the importance of adopting multifaceted consultation strategies, providing meaningful possibilities for
accommodation of Aboriginal concerns, continuously investing in longterm relationships, and promoting transboundary Aboriginal networks
and leadership. Sustained political commitment and provision of capacity
support on the part of Canadian governments will be necessary to put these
recommendations into practice.

